Obtaining information about changes in market conditions is vital for the survival of the firms operating in a changing environment. In this paper, we offer a theory of information flows in a setting in which the principal faces a project choice and needs to induce the agent, who is responsible for production, to acquire and transmit a signal to improve the matching between the project and the environment. Distortions in information flows arise since the production cost is known only to the agent and therefore he may protect his rent by withholding the signal. The optimal incentive scheme exhibits countervailing incentives which create a trade-off between the amount of transmitted information and rent extraction. Our theory offers a rationale for the separation of day-to-day operating decisions from long-term strategic decisions stressed by Williamson. Finally, we apply our model to the issue of monopolist's incentive to innovate and derive implications.
Introduction
How to motivate agents to acquire and/or transmit information is a fundamental question in any organization. Information management is particularly important for the firms operating in a changing environment since their success or failure is crucially determined by the ability to adjust to changes, which in turn depends on the ability to obtain information about the changes.
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In this paper, we offer a theory of information flows focusing on agent(s)' incentives to acquire and/or transmit information. Indeed, distortions in bottom-up information flows are emphasized by Simon (1961) as a major problem of hierarchies 2 and information withholding is well documented by sociologists like Crozier (1967) and Dalton (1959) . 3 In our approach, we distinguish two kinds of information that an agent can possess: information about parameters which directly determine his payoff (such as his ability or his private benefit accruing from some tasks) and other information relevant for the decision making of his organization (such as information about changes in technology or in consumer tastes). When the former is private information, the agent can obtain an information rent. This in turn induces him to be strategic in transmitting the latter, which he would transmit if he did not derive any rent from the former. Therefore, in order to design an incentive scheme to improve information flows, we need to study how the information in question is linked to the underlying information structure generating the rent.
The above ideas are formalized in a principal-agent model in which the principal faces a project choice in an uncertain environment and the agent has to execute two tasks: to acquire and transmit information about the environment, and then to produce. The agent has private information about his productive efficiency. Our analysis is focused on how rent-seeking behav-ior affects the incentive to acquire and transmit the information which allows the principal to improve the match between a project and the environment. Therefore, the term "information flow" refers to the bottom-up transmission of this information. We address the following questions: What is the optimal incentive scheme to induce the agent to acquire and transmit information when the same agent is charged with production? This question is closely related to the following question: which type of the agent should be induced to acquire and transmit information? What organizational responses can be made to improve information flows? In particular, can task separation perform better than task integration? After investigating these questions, we apply our model to the issue of monopolist's incentive to innovate and derive implications.
When the information is good news in the sense that the agent does not suffer any loss in the rent after transmitting the information, there would be no distortion in information flows. Hence, we mostly focus on the case of bad news and find that the optimal incentive scheme exhibits countervailing incentives 4 which create a trade-off between the amount of transmitted information and rent extraction. We also offer a rationale for the separation of day-to-day decisions from long-term strategic decisions, stressed by Chandler (1966) and Williamson (1975) as the major characteristic of M-form structure.
In our model, the principal faces a choice between the default project and a new one. The agent is assumed to be risk neutral and protected by limited liability. He can receive or not a signal which shows that the environment is favorable to the new project. In the absence of the signal, it is optimal for the principal to choose the default project. Because the principal does not know whether or not the agent has received the signal, the agent can withhold it and pretend not to have received any.
To provide the intuition about the countervailing incentives, we consider the case in which information acquisition is costless and the agent either receives or not the signal before the principal offers a mechanism. This case represents the situations in which agents receive information as by-products of executing their tasks. Suppose that the agent's type can be either efficient or inefficient. It is well known that given a project choice, the efficient type's incentive constraint is binding and the inefficient type has no rent. Assume that given a project choice, the efficient type obtains a higher rent under the default project than under the new project. Suppose now that the project choice is endogenous and the agent should be induced to transmit the signal. Then, the principal can induce either both types to transmit the signal or only the type losing less from the change to the new project, i.e., the inefficient type, to transmit the signal. In the first case, the principal has to make a large compensation to the efficient type to induce him to transmit the signal such that there exist countervailing incentives: the inefficient type can obtain a strictly positive rent by pretending to be the efficient type and by transmitting the signal. However, in the second case, the inefficient type does not obtain any rent by transmitting the signal. Therefore, there exists a trade-off between obtaining the signal from the efficient type and extracting the rent from the inefficient type. This can make it optimal to induce only the inefficient type to transmit the signal. For the same reason, when the principal has to induce the agent to incur a cost to acquire the signal, it can be optimal to induce only the inefficient type to acquire and transmit the signal. In this case, the project choice exhibits a bias toward the default project compared to the situation in which the principal herself can obtain the signal. The principal's payoff is strictly increasing in the probability of facing the inefficient type.
Under task separation, there are two agents: one charged with information acquisition and transmission and the other with production. As the former does not take into account the negative externalities which he inflicts on the latter, information flows better under task separation than under integration. This offers a rationale for the separation of day-to-day operating decisions from long-term strategic decisions, which is emphasized as the main feature of M-form structure by Chandler (1966) and Williamson (1975) . Under M-form structure, day-to-day operating decisions are assigned to operating divisions while long-term strategic decisions are made by the general office. M-form structure is a response to the problem raised by U-form structure in which functional executives took both responsibilities and thus became advocates representing the interests of their respective divisions. However, we also discuss some factors limiting the advantage of task separation over task integration.
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After analyzing the model, we make two applications to derive implications on monopolist's incentive to innovate. The existing IO literature on the issue has identified two important incentive effects: the replacement effect and the efficiency effect. 6 The former occurs when a monopolist launches a new product replacing the old one. Since its profit from the old product will be replaced by the profit from the new one, it will have less incentive to innovate than a competitive firm having no profit to be replaced. Suppose now that if the monopolist does not innovate, an entrant will innovate and enter. Then, if the monopolist does not innovate, its profit will decrease because of entry. The efficiency effect refers to this increased incentive to innovate relative to an entrant which loses no profit by not innovating.
In our applications, the (product) innovation occurs when there is a good matching between the project and the environment. In order to achieve the innovation, the monopolist must induce the agent to transmit the signal about the environment. From our previous results, we can identify a replacement effect: when the agent has a high rent under the current project, it is hard for the monopolist to innovate since the agent is afraid of having the rent replaced by a low one and consequently withholds the signal. In the first application, we explore this replacement effect in a dynamic context and identify a tension between process innovation and product innovation. In particular, we find that the tension can make the value of the process innovation negative and a bias toward the current project optimal. Hence, the dynamic application offers an explanation of Drucker's claim: ". . . when market or industry structure changes, the producers or suppliers who are today's industry leaders will be found neglecting the fastest-growing market segments (Drucker (1985) , p. 86)." In the second application, we derive an efficiency effect by studying a monopolist threatened by entry and show that the monopolist's profit can be increasing in the number of potential entrants because the threat of entry disciplines the agent.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the related literature. In Section 3, we present the model. In Section 4, we derive the key intuition by analyzing the basic model in which information acquisition is costless and the agent receives or not the signal before the principal offers a mechanism. In Section 5, we analyze the case in which the principal has to induce the agent to incur a cost to acquire information. In Section 6, we present two applications dealing with monopolist's incentive to innovate. In Section 7, we extend the basic model to the case of continuum of types and to the case of no-commitment and also discuss robustness of our main results. In Section 8, we conclude and suggest directions for future research.
Related literature
Information acquisition in principal-agent relationships has been studied by Crémer and Khalil (1992) , Rochet (1996, 1997) , and Lewis and Sappington (1997) . In this literature, the agent can acquire information about the cost parameter after incurring some expense. Thus, one important question they ask is whether or not it is better to induce the agent to know his type. In contrast, in our paper, the agent knows his cost parameter at the outset and information acquisition is about the desirability of projects. We are interested in knowing which type of the agent should be given the incentive to acquire information. Putting it in a different way, we deal with a two-dimensional screening problem 7 in which one-dimensional information should be acquired by the agent.
In the literature on multi-tasking, we can distinguish models with moral hazard (Holmström and Milgrom (1990, 1991) , Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) ) from those with adverse selection (Laffont and Tirole (1991) ). Our model belongs to the second. In terms of findings, though, our paper is related to that of Dewatripont and Tirole. They offer an argument favoring advocacy over nonpartisanship: a nonpartisan's incentives are impaired by his pursuing several conflicting causes at the same time. This argument is similar to the intuition for our result favoring task separation over task integration. However, their result is derived from an incompleteness of the contracts in that they assume that the principal cannot base rewards on information but only on final decisions. Indeed, in their paper, if rewards can be based on information, there is no need for advocacy. In our model, direct rewards based on information are allowed.
7 See for instance Armstrong and Rochet (1999) for two-dimensional screening problem. Hirao (1994) studies the conditions under which it is optimal to assign both project evaluation and operation tasks to the same agent in a moral hazard setting. In his model, the principal faces the choice between a safe project and a risky one. Since effort is not necessary for the safe one, given a project choice, the agent can get a rent only with the risky one and consequently has a preference for it. Assuming that the signal is soft information, he shows that task separation is optimal when the accuracy of the signal is exogenous. Our paper differs from his not only in terms of modeling choice (we use an adverse selection model and assume that the signal is hard information) but also in terms of focus: we are interested in the reasons why firms fail to adjust to changes and their implications on innovations.
There exist other papers on informational separation versus integration. Baron and Besanko (1992) and Gilbert and Riordan (1995) show in the context of regulation of complementary products that the latter dominates the former. On the contrary, Laffont and Martimort (1999) show that separation of regulators dominates integration in dealing with the threat of regulatory capture.
The project choice in our paper can be seen as a quality choice in the literature on quality provision (e.g., Che (1993), Laffont and Tirole (1991) , Lewis and Sappington (1991) and Rogerson (1990) ). However, in these papers, the principal can exactly evaluate her surplus given a quality level. In contrast, in our paper, the principal needs to induce the agent to transmit information in order to evaluate the benefit from her project choice. Indeed, Leitzel (1991) emphasizes this point in the context of military procurement.
3 The model
Projects, tasks and technology
There is one principal and one agent. The principal must choose one of two projects: the default project or the new project. The project is denoted by j, where j = d represents the default project and j = n the new project. The environment, denoted by ², can be favorable to one of the two projects. If ² = d, it is favorable to the default project and if ² = n, it is favorable to the new project. Let µ denote the probability of having ² = d. For simplicity, we assume µ = 1 2 . The agent has two tasks: first, to acquire and transmit information about the environment and then to produce. Before the principal offers the mechanism, the agent discovers his type θ, which represents his productive efficiency. The type is efficient (θ = θ) with probability ν and inefficient (θ = θ) with probability 1 − ν. His cost of production depends on the project and the type. θ j represents the efficient type's cost under project j while θ j represents that of the inefficient type. The difference between the two values, denoted by ∆θ j ≡ θ j − θ j , is assumed to be positive for all j. The agent's type and consequently his production cost are his private information. The distribution of the type is common knowledge.
Information about the environment
Let σ be information received about the environment. The agent either receives the signal s (i.e., σ = s) or does not receive any signal (i.e., σ = ∅). The probability of receiving σ conditional on the realization of the environment is given as follows:
Hence, given that the agent received σ, the probability of having ² = d, denoted by µ σ , is given by:
x represents the ex ante probability of receiving s. The agent can always pretend to have received σ = ∅. For simplicity, we assume that the signal s is verifiable. However, the outcomes of the optimal mechanisms can be implemented even when the signal is not verifiable if the projects are contractible and the principal can understand the meaning of the signal. We distinguish two cases. In the first case, information acquisition is costless and the agent receives σ before the principal offers a mechanism. In the second, the agent has to incur a cost to receive s and the principal can use her mechanism to induce him to incur the cost. The cost is interpreted as the disutility of exerting effort and therefore the principal cannot observe whether or not the agent incurs the cost. We think that both cases are relevant: agents often receive information as by-products of executing their tasks but sometimes they need to exert effort to look for specific information.
Utilities and mechanism
The principal's utility is given by her benefit minus the transfer made to the agent. Her benefit, denoted by B ² j , depends on the matching between her project choice j and the realized environment. We assume that B ² j is given by:
An example of the above benefit function is the core activity choice in the computer industry. In this sector, core activity must be well adapted to rapidly changing market conditions. Since we have in mind long-term impacts on the principal's payoff, we assume that benefit is not contractible.
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The agent's utility is equal to the transfer from the principal minus the information acquisition and production costs. The agent is assumed to have limited liability such that he can quit the organization at any time and gets his reservation utility.
10 Therefore, ex post participation constraints should be satisfied. However, when the agent can costlessly receive the signal before the principal offers a mechanism, our results hold even though the participation constraints are written in expected terms. His reservation utility is normalized to zero regardless of type.
According to the revelation principle, we can restrict our attention, without loss of generality, to the set of direct revelation mechanisms:
where b θ (respectively, b σ) represents the agent's report about the type (respectively, the signal), q(·) is the probability the principal will ask the agent to acquire information, p(·) is the probability of choosing the default project and t(·) is the transfer to the agent. After receiving the agent's report b θ, the principal asks him to acquire information with probability q(·). In this case, the agent should make report about the signal after acquiring information and the principal implements the contract
. With probability 1 − q(·), the principal does not ask him to acquire information and implements the contract
where NA means no acquisition of information. Because of the ex post participation constraints, the transfers depend on the project chosen. Since we suppose that the principal must choose one of two projects and cannot choose both projects at the same time, the probability of realizing the new project is equal to 1 − p. 
Main assumptions
When the cost differential between the two types is larger under the default project than under the new project (∆θ d > ∆θ n ), 12 the signal is bad news from the efficient type's point of view in the following sense: if the signal s were obtained by the principal, she would choose the new project and this would decrease his rent since the transfer he receives is determined by the inefficient type's cost. Since the inefficient type is indifferent between the two projects, the signal is bad news to the agent in a weak sense when ∆θ d > ∆θ n holds.
The inequality ∆θ d > ∆θ n is likely to hold in reality provided that the efficient type is better than the inefficient type at reducing costs. For instance, consider the case in which the principal chooses one among several projects which initially have the same cost differential. Suppose that while working on the project, the agent accumulates know-how to decrease the production cost. If the efficient type accumulates more know-how than the inefficient type does, the cost differential will be larger under the current (default) project than under any other project having the same initial cost differential. Since we have in mind a situation in which the principal considers choice between the current project and a new one, we focus on the case ∆θ d > ∆θ n although we analyze the opposite case ∆θ d ≤ ∆θ n as well. We adopt the following assumptions.
Assumption 0: The signal is bad news (∆θ d > ∆θ n ) .
Assumption 1:
Assumption 1 justifies the notion of the default project. Suppose that there is no possibility of information acquisition about the environment. Under Assumption 1, it is then optimal for the principal to keep the default project regardless of type. 
Benchmark: Information acquisition by the principal
Consider as a benchmark the case in which the principal herself can acquire information about the environment. In this case, it is easy to show that, if
is optimal for the principal to acquire information regardless of type and to choose the new project if and only if σ = s. We assume that the above condition holds:
14 We note that the problem of informed principal does not arise under Assumption 2 since she will make the same project choice regardless of whether or not σ is public information.
The case represents the situations in which the agent receives information as by-products of executing his job. The intuition, derived in this section, about the trade-off between the amount of transmitted information and rent extraction can still be applied to the case of costly information acquisition, analyzed in the next section. In this section, we consider Bayesian participation constraints. However, it is easy to check that the optimal mechanism derived in this section is still optimal even if we consider ex post participation constraints. The principal's program is similar to that of a standard mechanism design with multi-dimensional screening.
According to the revelation principle, without loss of generality, we can restrict our attention to the set of direct revelation mechanisms:
We introduce the following notation regarding the agent's utility:
To induce acceptance, the mechanism should satisfy the following individual rationality constraint for each (σ, θ):
To induce truth-telling, the mechanism should satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraints:
We note that since s is verifiable, the agent cannot pretend to have received s when σ = ∅. The principal's program, denoted by P T , is given by:
where
The next proposition characterizes the optimal mechanism.
Proposition 1 (information transmission) Under assumptions 0 to 2, the optimal mechanism for information transmission is characterized by: 1. Binding constraints:
2. The optimal mechanism exhibits no bias or a bias toward the default project. In each case, we have:
· bias toward the default project: 1) the efficient type:
The optimal mechanism exhibits a bias toward the default project if ν ∈ (0, ν T ), with ν T defined below:
In this case, the principal's expected net benefit is strictly decreasing in ν.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Concerning the binding constraints, when the agent received ∅, the inefficient type's individual rationality constraint and the efficient type's incentive compatibility constraint are binding, which is quite standard. Consider now the case in which the agent received s. In order to induce the efficient type to transmit the signal, the principal has to concede him the rent that he would obtain by concealing the signal and pretending to be the inefficient type, which makes the constraint (IC : (s, θ) → (∅, θ)) binding. Since this binding constraint requires the principal to give the efficient type such a high transfer, there exist countervailing incentives: the inefficient type's incentive compatibility constraint (IC : (s, θ) → (s, θ)) is binding (see Figure 1) .
When the optimal mechanism exhibits no bias, the principal chooses the new project whenever the signal s is reported. When it exhibits a bias ) , Figure 1 : Binding incentive constraints under task integration toward the default project, the principal chooses the new project only if it is the inefficient type who reports the signal. To give an intuition for why the bias can be optimal, we examine the agent's rent. First, the efficient type's rent is given by ∆θ d regardless of whether the mechanism is biased or not. As long as the principal maintains the default project when the inefficient type reports ∅, the efficient type can always have a rent equal to ∆θ d by adopting the following strategy: he pretends to be the inefficient type and reports ∅.
Second, the inefficient type's rent depends on whether the mechanism exhibits a bias or not. If there is no bias, the principal should compensate for the decrease in the rent from ∆θ d to ∆θ n in order to induce the efficient type to report the signal. This makes the principal pay a transfer beyond the inefficient type's production cost that the inefficient type can obtain a rent equal to ∆θ d − ∆θ n if he reports the signal. By contrast, if there is the bias, the inefficient type obtains no rent since the principal always maintains the default project for the efficient type.
Therefore, the optimal mechanism will exhibit a bias toward the default project if the expected benefit from choosing the new project when the efficient type transmits the signal νx(B n + θ d − θ n ) is smaller than the expected rent abandoned to the inefficient type (1−ν)x(∆θ d −∆θ n ). This trade-off can be viewed as a trade-off between the amount of transmitted information and rent extraction if we interpret the direct mechanism such that when there is the bias toward the default project, the efficient type does not transmit the signal s. Then, the principal must abandon larger rent when she induces both types to transmit the signal than when she induces only the inefficient type to transmit the signal.
When the optimal mechanism is biased toward the default project, the principal's expected net benefit is increasing in the probability of choosing the new project and hence in the probability of facing the inefficient type. When the optimal mechanism is unbiased, the principal gives the same transfer regardless of type. Thus, her expected net benefit is independent of the probability of facing the inefficient type.
In section 7, we study the case of continuum of types and find that the countervailing incentives not only create a bias toward the default project (when σ = s, the default project is chosen for relatively efficient types) but also a bias toward the new project (when σ = ∅, the new project is chosen for relatively inefficient types).
Costly information acquisition
In this section, we analyze the case in which the principal must induce the agent to incur cost k ≥ 0 to obtain the signal s. After analyzing the optimal mechanism under task integration, we compare task integration with task separation. Finally, we briefly examine the case in which the signal is good news.
Task integration
As explained in Section 3, the mechanism is given by
For expositional facility, we introduce some notation:
V (NA, b θ, θ) and U(NA, θ) are similarly defined.
To induce acceptance, the mechanism should satisfy the ex ante individual rationality constraint:
(4) To induce truthful report of type, the mechanism should satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint. There are two kinds of incentive constraints since, after announcing the false type b θ(6 = θ), the agent can decide either to acquire and transmit information,
(5) or not to acquire information,
In order to induce the agent to acquire and transmit information after the truthful report of type, the mechanism should satisfy the moral hazard constraint:
The mechanism should satisfy the ex post participation constraints for every state of nature:
The principal's program, denoted by P A , is given by:
subject to (4) to (8) where
Proposition 2 (information acquisition and transmission) Suppose that assumptions 0 to 2 hold. Under task integration, the optimal mechanism for information acquisition and transmission is characterized by: 1. The binding constraints: (Expost IR : ∅, j | θ), (Expost IR : NA, j | θ), (IC : θ, NA), (MH : θ), (IC : θ, A) .
2. The optimal mechanism exhibits either no bias or a bias toward the default project. In each case, we have:
· a bias toward the default project: 1) the efficient type:
2) the inefficient type:
The optimal mechanism exhibits a bias toward the default project for ν ∈ (0, ν A ), with ν A (≥ ν T ) defined below:
Proof. See appendix 2.
The features of the optimal mechanism characterized above are very similar to those of the optimal mechanism characterized in Proposition 1. First, the nature of the binding constraints is similar. The inefficient type's ex post participation constraint is binding when he does not transmit the signal s. The efficient type's rent is equal to the rent that he obtains when he pretends to be the inefficient type and does not acquire information. Since it is more difficult to induce the efficient type to acquire and transmit information, the moral hazard constraint is binding for the efficient type. This can make the principal pay such a high transfer to the efficient type transmitting s that there may be countervailing incentives: the inefficient type may obtain a positive rent by pretending to be the efficient type and acquiring and transmitting s.
Second, in both cases, the optimal mechanism can exhibit either no bias or a bias toward the default project. If it does not exhibit any bias, the inefficient type can obtain a positive rent when he reports the signal s. If it exhibits a bias for the default project, the principal obtains the signal only from the inefficient type and her expected net benefit is strictly increasing in the probability of facing the inefficient type. In this case, the principal does not induce the efficient type to acquire information.
Last, whether or not the optimal mechanism exhibits the bias is determined by the trade-off between the amount of transmitted information and rent extraction. The principal compares the gain from inducing the efficient type to acquire and transmit information with the loss from giving a positive rent to the inefficient type. A minor difference with respect to the case of information transmission comes from the fact that when information acquisition is endogenous, the principal takes into account the cost of information acquisition. This makes the bias toward the default project more likely in the case of costly information acquisition.
Task separation versus integration
In this section, we study an alternative organizational mode, task separation, and compare this with task integration. Under task separation, there are two agents: A 1 entrusted with information acquisition and A 2 assigned to production. For simplicity, we assume that the cost of acquiring information is not affected by the choice of organizational mode. Then, it is easy to see that, under task separation, the principal can achieve the outcome of the benchmark in which the principal herself can acquire information. Since A 1 does not drive any information rent from production, the principal can induce information acquisition and transmission without any additional cost. Given σ reported by A 1 , only the efficient type's incentive compatibility constraint is binding for A 2 (see Figure 2) . Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 3 (task separation) Under task separation, the principal can achieve the outcome that she obtains when she herself can acquire information.
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To compare task separation with task integration, we need to compare Figure 2 with Figure 1 . Under task separation, there is no countervailing incentive since the agent charged with information acquisition does not take into account the negative externalities that he inflicts on the other agent. Hence, obtaining the signal is less costly under task separation than under task integration. To illustrate this point, we compare the optimal mechanism under task separation with the optimal mechanism under task integration which exhibits no bias. Under task separation, the inefficient type never obtains any rent while the efficient type's rent can be either ∆θ d or ∆θ n depending on A 1 's report. In contrast, under task integration, the efficient type's rent is always equal to ∆θ d while the inefficient type obtains a positive rent ∆θ d − ∆θ n if he reports the signal. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 4 (separation versus integration) When the signal is bad news, under assumptions 1 and 2, task separation dominates task integration.
The comparison between task separation and task integration sheds light on the separation of day-to-day operating decisions from long-term strategic decisions, stressed by Chandler (1966) and Williamson (1975) as the major characteristic of the M-form structure. Under the M-form structure, day-today operating decisions are assigned to functional divisions and long-term strategic decisions are assigned to the general office to which an elite staff is attached to secure greater control over the divisions and to provide information. The agent assigned to production can be regarded as an operating division and the agent charged with information acquisition as the elite staff. Since information concerning long-term strategies affects less the staff's interest than those of the divisions, it is easier to induce the staff to transmit information than to induce the divisions to do so. In fact, Williamson notes that when functional executives have responsibility for long-term strategy under the U-form structure, they become advocates representing the interests of their respective divisions.
Remarks However, there are several factors which decrease the relative advantage of task separation over task integration. First of all, agents do not have equal access to information. For instance, a marketing division has better access to information about demand than the elite staff does. Second, we focused on the incentive to transmit bad news. When it comes to good news, as we will see in the next section, task separation has no advantage over task integration. Furthermore, when the principal lacks commitment power and information acquisition is costly, the principal has to rely on the agent's initiative to acquire information.
16 Then, the agent will take an initiative only under task integration. Last, since the agent charged with information Figure 2 : Binding incentive constraints for A 2 under task separation acquisition possesses some power over the agent assigned to production, collusive behavior is likely to appear under task separation.
When the signal is good news
In this section, we briefly examine the case in which the signal is good news (∆θ d ≤ ∆θ n ). Then, all the assumptions must be modified as follows:
Under assumption 1 0 , the principal maintains the default project regardless of type if information acquisition is impossible. Under assumption 2 0 , if the principal can acquire information, it is optimal for her to acquire information regardless of type and to choose the new project if and only if σ = s.
Under the above assumptions, task integration is equivalent to task separation. Since the efficient type's rent is greater under the new project than under the default project, the principal does not need to concede any compensation beyond the cost of information acquisition in order to induce the efficient type to report the signal. Therefore, the incentive constraints are binding as in Figure 2 and there is no loss from integrating both tasks. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 5 (good news) When the signal is good news, under assumptions 1 0 and 2 0 , task integration is equivalent to task separation.
Applications: monopolist's incentive to innovate
In this section, we apply the basic model studied in Section 4 to the problem of monopolist's incentive to innovate. The existing IO literature on the issue has identified two important incentive effects: the replacement effect and the efficiency effect. 17 The replacement effect occurs when a monopolist launches a new product replacing the old one. Since the monopolist's profit from the old product will be replaced by the profit from the new one, it will have less incentive to innovate than a competitive firm having no profit to be replaced. Suppose now that if the monopolist does not innovate, an entrant will innovate and enter. Then, if the monopolist does not innovate, its profit will decrease because of entry. Hence, it has more incentive to innovate than an entrant which loses no profit by not innovating. The efficiency effect refers to this and boosts monopoly's incentive to innovate in contrast to the replacement effect.
In the applications, the (product) innovation occurs when there is a good matching between the firm's project choice and the business environment. In order to innovate, the monopolist should induce the agent to transmit the signal about the environment. Then, we can identify a replacement effect from the analysis done in Section 4: when the agent has a high rent under the current project, the monopolist has difficulties in innovating since the agent is afraid of having the rent replaced by a low one and conceals the signal. We will below develop two applications. In the first, we explore the replacement effect in a dynamic context to show a tension between product innovation and process innovation. In the second, we derive an efficiency effect by examining a monopolist threatened by entry and show that the monopolist's profit can be increasing in the number of potential entrants.
Dynamic application
In this section, we make a simple two-period extension to show how the agency relationship affects the patterns of innovation of an incumbent firm. For this purpose, we distinguish process innovation and from product innovation. The first is an innovation that diminishes the production cost of a given product. The second is an innovation that enables a firm to launch a new product filling niches. In our model, product innovation arises if the principal chooses the new project when the environment is favorable for the new project.
The model
There are two periods. During the first period (t = 1), there is no uncertainty about the environment and it is optimal to maintain the default project. For simplicity, we assume that the agent does not know his type until the end of t = 1.
18 At the end of t = 1, the agent discovers his type and receives signal σ about the second period (t = 2) environment. What happens from the end of t = 1 is modeled as in Section 4. The principal has to adjust her project to the changes in the environment at t = 2. We assume that the principal cannot commit to a long-term contract.
At t = 1, the agent can exert effort to make the process innovation which decreases the second period cost of the default project. When the innovation is unsuccessful, the inefficient type's second period cost is given by θ d and the efficient type's one is given by θ d . When it is successful, the extent of cost reduction depends on the type: the inefficient type's cost will be reduced by ∆(> 0) while the efficient type's one will be reduced by (1 + γ)∆ with γ > 0. Thus, we assume that the efficient type is better at cost reduction than the inefficient type. The process innovation becomes obsolete if the new project is adopted for t = 2.
We normalize effort e to represent the probability of success of the process innovation: 0 ≤ e ≤ 1. The disutility of effort is given by ψ(e) with ψ 0 (·) > 0, ψ 0 (0) = 0, ψ 00 (·) > 0, ψ 000 (·) ≥ 0 and −2ψ 00 (·)+(1−e)ψ 000 (·) < 0 19 . The success or failure of the process innovation is contractible. Hence, the principal offers 18 This is to avoid the complication from the ratchet effect. 19 The last condition is needed to make the principal's maximization problem concave. Examples satisfying the conditions about ψ(·) are: w ∆ when it is successful and w 0 when it is not. We assume limited liability such that w ∆ and w 0 should be positive:
For simplicity, we assume ∆θ d = ∆θ n = ∆θ. Hence, the signal is bad news only when the process innovation is successful. The modifications of assumptions 1 and 2 are straightforward and given as follows: 20 Assumption 1 * :
Consider as a benchmark the case of task separation. Under assumptions 1 * and 2 * , the project choice solely depends on the signal and the value of process innovation will be always strictly positive.
Tension between process and product innovation
Consider now the case of task integration. Since the rent that the efficient type obtains from the default project is larger in the presence of the process innovation than in its absence, the innovation makes the principal concede more compensation to obtain the signal. From Proposition 1, if this increase in compensation is large enough to satisfy the following condition, denoted by (B), it is optimal to introduce a bias toward the default project:
(B) means that, when process innovation is successful, the rent given to the inefficient type is larger than the expected benefit from choosing the new project when the efficient type reports the signal. If (B) holds, the principal induces only the inefficient type to transmit the signal when the process innovation is successful. Therefore, there exists a severe tension between the process and the product innovation: the process innovation, by increasing 20 Under assumption 1 * , if there is no possibility of information acquisition, the principal maintains the default project at t = 2 regardless of type and regardless of the success or failure of the process innovation. Under assumption 2 * , if the principal herself can receive the signal, she chooses the new project at t = 2 if and only if σ = s regardless of type and regardless of the success or failure of the process innovation. the rent which is specific to the current project, induces the efficient type to resist the adoption of the new project.
We now show that the value of the process innovation can be negative. Consider for instance the case when (B) does not hold. When (B) does not hold, the agent's program is given by:
where δ represents the weight for the second period. The process innovation increases the efficient type's rent by γ∆ and also increases the inefficient type's rent by γ∆ if the latter receives the signal. The first order condition is given by:
The principal's program is given by:
subject to (9) and (LL).
When the agent receives no signal, which occurs with probability 1 − x, the innovation increases the principal's payoff by ∆. In contrast, when he receives the signal, which occurs with probability x, the innovation decreases her payoff since the compensation that she must make to obtain the signal is increased by γ∆. Therefore, the value of the process innovation is negative if 1 < x(1 + γ) holds. In this case, there is a conflict of interest between the principal and the agent with respect to whether or not to pursue the process innovation. When (B) holds, the value of the process innovation is negative if 1 < x(1 + γ) and (1 − x + νx)∆ < νxA hold.
In the next proposition, we characterize the optimal contract.
Proposition 6 (process versus product innovation) Suppose ∆θ d = ∆θ n . Under assumptions 1 * and 2 * , the optimal contract for the process innovation and the project choice is such that:
) is smaller than a threshold 21 :
There is no bias in the project choice but the value of the process innovation is negative for 1 < x(1 + γ).
2. When ∆(1 + γ ν
) is larger than the threshold : There is a bias toward the default project when the process innovation is successful. The value of the process innovation is negative for 1 < x(1 + γ) and (1 − x + νx)∆ < νxA.
Proof. For a complete characterization, see Appendix 3.
The dynamic application gives useful insight about how the agency relationship affects the patterns of innovation of a firm. "The replacement effect" creates a tension between process and product innovation such that introducing a bias toward the default project can be optimal. Hence, our results offer an explanation of Drucker's claim: ". . . when market or industry structure changes, the producers or suppliers who are today's industry leaders will be found neglecting the fastest-growing market segments (Drucker (1985) , p. 86)."
The application also shows a case against high-powered incentive schemes. By creating a rent which is specific to the current project, a high-powered incentive scheme can create large distortions in information flows.
As an illustration, consider IBM's core activity choice in the past. During the eighties, IBM's core activity consisted of mainframe production while market demand was shifting toward microcomputers. According to Friesen and Mills (1996, p. 88) , IBM faced a serious crisis in the nineties since it failed to make changes in a timely manner and exhibited an inertia. Our model suggests that the inertia could have resulted from distortions in information flows from the mainframe division to the CEO. In fact, the same authors mention that division executives began to put the welfare of their own organizations above that of the corporation as a whole and that this was manifested in the resistance of the mainframe division to the introduction of new technology that might damage sales of its products (pp. 128-29).
Monopolist threatened by entry
Consider now a monopolist facing entry from potential competitors. Suppose that they play the following sequential game. First, the monopolist chooses its project as described in Section 4. Next, the competitors make entry decision. We assume that the entry is not profitable if the monopolist's project choice is well matched to the environment. Let m denote the number of the potential entrants. Let y(m), with y 0 > 0, denote the probability that there will be a successful entry conditional on that the monopolist chose a bad project. For simplicity, we assume that a successful entry implies the exit of the monopolist from the market. 22 Let B x (<< −θ d )) represent the monopolist's benefit in case of exit.
We focus on the case in which the signal is bad news to the agent (∆θ d > ∆θ n ) and B d and B n are large enough that it is optimal for the principal to have no bias in project choice p(∅, θ) = p ∅ = 1 and p(s, θ) = p s = 0 for all θ. This implies, from the incentive constraints, t(∅, θ) = t(∅, θ) = t ∅ and t(s, θ) = t(s, θ) = t s . Then, it is easy to see that the following constraints are binding. First, the inefficient type's individual rationality constraint is binding when he did not receive the signal, implying t ∅ = θ d . Second, the incentive compatibility constraint to induce the efficient type to transmit the signal s, written below, is binding if y(m) is small enough;
Since the agent has no rent after the exit of his firm, the rent that the efficient type can obtain by withholding the signal decreases in the probability of entry and thus decreases in the number of the entrants. This shows the discipline that the threat of entry exercises on the agent. We assume below that the above incentive constraint is binding: in other words, m is smaller than m * , which is defined by
Given the binding constraints, the monopolist's expected profit is given by
where ξ(= 2x) represents the probability of receiving the signal conditional on ² = n. From the first order derivative of Eπ with respect to m, we have
22 Our results hold as long as the entry reduces the agent's rent.
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The first term is positive and represents an efficiency effect: the fact that the agent will lose his rent after a successful entry increases his incentive to transmit the signal and consequently the transfer that the principal needs to pay to obtain the signal is decreasing in m. The second term is negative and represents the loss from the increase in the probability of exit. Hence, the profit will be increasing in m if ξ is large enough:
. For instance, if ξ = 1, there will be no entry in equilibrium and the increase in m only reduces the agent's rent. We note that when m > m * , the expected profit is decreasing in m since the first term disappears.
We summarize the result in the next proposition.
Proposition 7 (entry) Suppose that the signal is bad news and that B d and B
n are large enough. Then, if the probability of receiving the signal s conditional on that the environment is favorable to the new project is large enough
the monopolist's expected profit is increasing in the number of entrants m for m < m * .
Extensions and robustness
In this section, we present two extensions of the basic model analyzed in Section 4 and show that project choice under task integration can exhibit both "excess inertia" and "excess momentum" compared to task separation. 23 We also provide some discussions of the robustness of our main results.
Continuum of types
Consider the basic model and suppose that there are a continuum of types: θ follows the distribution function F (·) with density f(·)(> 0) and support £ θ, θ ¤ . Type θ's cost of production under project j is given by C j (θ) with C 0 j (θ) > 0. We assume that the signal is bad news, which is represented θ) ) denote the probability to choose the default project when the agent reports (σ, θ) under task separation (respectively, under task integration). In order to compare p S (σ, θ) with p I (σ, θ), we examine how type θ's virtual cost is determined in each organizational mode. Under task separation, as usual, type θ's virtual cost is given by
, which is larger than its true cost and independent of σ. In contrast, under task integration, type θ's virtual cost depends on σ. When σ = s, there are countervailing incentives such that the incentive constraint is binding for downward manipulations of report. Therefore, type θ's virtual cost is given by
and this creates an upward distortion in p I (θ, s): there exists "excess inertia" under task integration in the sense that the principal chooses the default project too often under task integration compared to task separation 24 . When σ = ∅, type θ's virtual cost
and this creates a downward distortion in p I (θ, s). The additional distortion
with respect to task separation appears because an increase in p I (∅, θ) increases the rent that the agent obtains by concealing s when σ = s. Therefore, there exists "excess momentum" under task integration in the sense that the principal chooses the new project too often under task integration compared to task separation. We note that excess momentum does not arise in the two-type case.
Proposition 8 (continuum of types) Consider the case of continuum of types and suppose that the following assumptions hold:
are decreasing in θ for all σ ∈ {∅, s}.
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A2:
for all θ.
26
Project choice under task integration exhibits both excess inertia and excess momentum compared to the project choice under task separation.
Proof. See Appendix 4.

No commitment
Consider still the basic model and suppose now that the principal cannot commit in advance to a mechanism to induce the agent to transmit the signal s and that the agent decides whether or not to release the signal before the 24 We remind that under task separation, there is no distortion in information flows.
f (θ) and
26 A2 is needed to satisfy the monotonicity condition in signal.
principal offers a mechanism. 27 We consider the case in which the signal s is bad news.
We study the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) in which the inefficient type always truthfully releases his signal. To define the PBE, we introduce some notation: z represents the probability for the efficient type to release s when he received s, µ(b σ) (respectively, ν(b σ)) represents the principal's revised prior about the probability that ² = d (respectively, the probability that θ = θ) conditional on receiving signal b σ from the agent and {p(θ | b σ), t(θ | b σ)} is the mechanism that the principal proposes after receiving b σ. Then, a PBE is defined by:
which satisfies the following three conditions:
2) µ(σ) and ν(σ) satisfy Bayes' rule, 3) given {z, µ(σ), ν(σ)}, p(θ | σ) and t(θ | σ) maximize the principal's payoff.
In the next proposition, we characterize the PBEs.
Proof. See Appendix 5.
We can easily show that there is no PBE in which the efficient type always truthfully releases his signal. Suppose that z = 1. Then, we have µ(σ) = µ σ and ν(σ) = ν. This implies that p(θ | s) = 0, p(θ | ∅) = 1, t(θ | s) = θ n , t(θ | ∅) = θ d . Given the principal's strategy, the efficient type obtains more rent by withholding s. Thus, there is a contradiction.
For ν small, when the efficient type withholds the signal s, its impact on µ(∅) and ν(∅) is marginal: µ(∅) and ν(∅) are close to µ ∅ and ν. Hence, the principal will maintain the default project when she does not receive s and the efficient type always conceal s. Therefore, the new project is chosen only when the efficient type receives s and therefore the lack of commitment does not generate any loss for ν small enough.
For ν large, if the efficient type withholds the signal, its impact on µ(∅) and ν(∅) is large: µ(∅) << µ ∅ and ν(∅) >> ν. Consequently, it becomes optimal for the principal to introduce a bias toward the new project when she does not receive s: she always chooses the new project for the inefficient type. Then, the efficient type obtains the same rent regardless of whether or not he releases the signal. Thus, releasing the signal with a positive probability can be an equilibrium. In this case, the lack of commitment generates two sorts of loss: the loss from the bias toward the new project and the loss from the fact that the efficient type conceals the signal with a positive probability.
Robustness of the main results
When the benefit is contractible, transfers can be contingent both on the project choice and on the realized environment: t(b σ, b θ, j, ²). However, benefit contractibility does not affect our results if the participation constraints have to be satisfied ex post as follows:
Then, the transfer to the inefficient type cannot be lower than his cost for every state of nature and this enables the efficient type obtains an information rent ∆θ d by pretending to be inefficient and withholding s.
When the principal can choose quantity to produce under each project, it is well-known that the principal's payoff is increasing in the probability of facing the efficient type. Hence, in this case, we expect to have a trade-off between the inefficient type's comparative advantage in information transmission and his comparative disadvantage in production.
Even though the signal cannot be verified by a court, the outcomes of the optimal mechanisms analyzed in Propositions 1 and 2 can still be implemented, if the principal can make her transfer contingent on the project choice and understands the meaning of the signal. Our results will change if the signal is soft information (i.e., when the agent can claim to have received the signal even though he did not receive any).
We assumed that the agent's reservation utility is normalized to zero regardless of type. Because of this, given a project choice, only the efficient type can obtain a rent. However, when the reservation utility is type-dependent, it is possible that the inefficient type obtains a rent while the efficient type has no rent. Then, it would be the inefficient type who resists the adoption of the new project.
Concluding remarks
When agents have information rents attached to the current project, they may try to resist the adoption of a new project by withholding information favorable to the adoption. Therefore, firms may fail to adjust to changes in the environment and their project choice can exhibit both excess inertia and excess momentum. We have shown that the separation of day-to-day decisions from long-term strategic decisions can be an organizational response to improve information flows. It would also be desirable to employ outsiders as advocates for change since it could be difficult to internally obtain information regarding changes. Our theory also suggests that it may be better to choose as a CEO a person with a good understanding of broad market trends than someone with specialized knowledge about some products.
Our model offers some clues to the process through which organizational knowledge is created and it will be interesting to pursue our research in this direction. In this regard, one central question is how the principal's investment in knowledge affects agents' incentives to invest in knowledge. For instance, both investments are substitutes in Aghion and Tirole (1997) while they are complements in Ellman (1999) .
The extension to the multi-agent case can offer a new perspective on the costs and benefits of integrating two firms by analyzing how integration or separation affects agents' incentives to acquire and transmit information.
Finally, it would be interesting to study how booms and recessions affect information flows inside a firm. This will help us to understand how fat is accumulated in a firm and also suggest interesting implications on downsizing strategies.
and U is given by (10). Since the first-order derivative of the above objective with respect to p(∅, θ) is positive, we have p(∅, θ) = 1. q(θ) ≡ q and then optimize the objective with respect to q(θ).
Step 1: Optimization with given q(θ) We define α and β as follows: a ≡ qα + (1 − q)β: α and β represent how the rent to the efficient type is distributed according to whether or not he is requested to acquire information. Without loss of generality, we can focus on α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0.
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Given α, from the binding (MH : θ), we have:
From the definition of β, we have
Therefore, given α and β, RP A (θ) can be separated into three independent subprograms:
Suppose that p(s | θ) is given. Then, the expected transfer to the efficient
there is no loss of generality in restricting our 30 As long as the transfer given to the efficient type is lower than his cost plus ∆θ n , the inefficient type can never obtain a rent by pretending to be the efficient type. If for instance α < 0 holds, there is a slack: the transfer is strictly lower than the efficient type's cost plus ∆θ n . Then, given a, the principal can increase α up to 0 and decrease β. This reduces the inefficient type's incentive to pretend to be efficient. We note that 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 holds. 31 It is equal to
attention to the transfers with t(s, j | θ) ≥ θ j . 32 If
holds, we can choose the transfers such that V (s, θ, θ) = 0. In this case, since a decrease in p(s | θ) improves project choice, the principal can decrease p(s | θ) up to the point where
Consider now the choice of p(s | θ) when
there exists a trade-off between good project choice and extraction of the inefficient type's rent as in Appendix 1. For α with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the optimal p(s | θ) is given as follows:
For α ≥ 1, we obtain the same result except that now p(s,
The subprograms RP
A (∅ : θ) and RP A (N : θ) can be similarly defined. After solving the subprograms, we find:
We now solve RP A (θ) with respect to (α, β) given
s optimal since, in this case, there is no distortion in the project choice and no rent to the inefficient type. For a ≥ 1 − q, ³ α = a−(1−q) q , β = 1´is optimal.
Step 2: Optimization with respect to q(θ) We now solve RP A (θ) with respect to q given a. It is obvious that for q ≤ 1 − a, q = 1 − a is optimal: as long as no rent is given to the inefficient type, it is optimal to induce the efficient type to acquire information. Hence, 32 When the inequality holds, we should have t(s, j | θ) ≥ θ j at least for one j. Furthermore, if t(s, j | θ) < θ j holds for some j, it means that t(s, j 0 | θ) > θ j 0 for j 0 6 = j. Then, by increasing t(s, j | θ) and reducing t(s, j 0 | θ), the principal can reduce the inefficient type's rent.
without loss of generality, we focus on q ≥ 1 − a. We distinguish two cases depending upon the value of B n . Case 1: B n − θ n + θ d − 1−ν ν (∆θ d − ∆θ n ) < 0 The program is given by:
subject to a = αq + (1 − q).
The first-order derivative of the objective with respect to q is equal to −k. Hence, q = 1 − a is optimal.
Case 2:
The program is given by:
The first-order derivative of the objective with respect to q is given as follows:
Therefore, we have In the reduced program, we ignore the constraint w ∆ ≥ 0. The optimal effort in the reduced program, denoted by e R , is determined by:
w ∆ ≥ 0 is slack as long as δ∆ [1 − x(1 + γ)] ≥ e R ψ 00 (e R ) holds. If δ∆ [1 − x(1 + γ)] < e R ψ 00 (e R ) holds, we have w * ∆ I = w * 0 I = 0 and the effort is determined by (9). Suppose now that 1 < x(1 + γ). Since the value of process innovation is negative, the optimal contract for innovation will have w 0 ≥ w ∆ = 0. Define the reduced program as follows: The optimal effort in the reduced program, denoted by e R , is determined by:
δ∆(1 − x)(1 + νγ) = ψ 0 (e R ) − (1 − e R )ψ 00 (e R ).
w 0 ≥ 0 is slack as long as −δ∆ [1 − x(1 + γ)] ≥ (1 − e R )ψ 00 (e R ) holds. If −δ∆ [1 − x(1 + γ)] < (1 − e R )ψ 00 (e R ) holds, we have w * ∆ I = w * 0 I = 0 and the effort is determined by (9).
Case 2: when there is a bias toward the default project Consider now the case in which there is a bias: (B) holds. Then, the inefficient type can never get any rent by reporting the signal. Hence, the agent's program is given by: max 0≤e≤1 e £ w ∆ + δνγ∆ ¤ + (1 − e)w 0 − ψ(e).
The first order condition is given by:
The principal's program is given by: For the rest of the proof, we can use the same kind of logic that is applied to the case where (B) holds.
Appendix 4
Consider task integration. The mechanism is given by {p(σ, θ), t(σ, θ)}. We can solve the program in two steps. In the first step, given [p(∅, θ), t(∅, θ)], we maximize the principal's payoff with respect to [p(s, θ), t(s, θ)]. In the second step, we maximize the principal's payoff with respect to [p(∅, θ), t(∅, θ)]. Define U (b σ, b θ : σ, θ) and U(σ, θ) as in Section 4. Then, the slope of the utility U(σ, θ) is given by:
We observe that the utility is decreasing in θ and that the absolute slope of the utility is increasing in p(σ, θ). Since we have p(s, θ) ≤ p(∅, θ) should hold from A2, the utility decreases more quickly when σ = ∅ than when σ = s.
The second order condition implies that:
p(σ, θ) is decreasing in θ for all σ.
It is easy to see that when σ = ∅, the utility is given by:
where the individual rationality constraint is binding for θ and IC((∅, θ) → (∅, b θ)) is binding for upward manipulations. When σ = s, the agent of type θ can obtain at least U (∅, θ) by concealing the signal. Hence, U (∅, θ) plays the role of type-dependent reservation utility. Since the utility decreases more quickly when σ = ∅ than when σ = s, the incentive compatibility constraint IC((s, θ) → (∅, θ)) is binding for θ and the utility is given by:
Hence, there are countervailing incentives in the sense that the incentive compatibility constraint IC((s, θ) → (s, b θ)) is binding for downward manipulations. After inserting the above utilities into the principal's objective, we can obtain the first order conditions with respect to p(σ, θ), which we described in Section 7. The case of task separation is just a standard problem.
